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Crowdsourcing Land Use∗ 
Lee Anne Fennell† 
Could the future of public land use control lie, quite 
literally, in the hands of the public? Local governments have 
increasingly embraced new technologies like smartphone apps 
and online interfaces for involving constituents in land use 
planning and control.1 The possibility that we could effectively 
“crowdsource”2 land use decisions through novel public 
engagement tools is an intriguing one that is beginning to attract 
scholarly attention.3 If land use conflicts represent information 
  
 ∗ © 2013 Lee Anne Fennell. All Rights Reserved. 
 † Max Pam Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research 
Scholar, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Eric Biber, Karen 
Bradshaw Schulz, Arden Rowell, Lior Strahilevitz, and the participants in Brooklyn 
Law School’s 2012 Trager Symposium, Post-Zoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land 
Use Controls, for helpful comments and conversations. I also thank the Stuart C. and 
JoAnn Nathan Faculty Fund for financial support. 
 1 See infra Part I (presenting and discussing examples).  
 2 The term “crowdsourcing” was coined by Jeff Howe. Jeff Howe, The Rise of 
Crowdsourcing, WIRED 14.06 (June 2006), http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/ 
14.06/crowds.html. In his book on the topic, Howe describes crowdsourcing as “an 
umbrella term for a highly varied group of approaches that share one obvious attribute 
in common: they all depend on some contribution from the crowd.” JEFF HOWE, 
CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF 
BUSINESS 280 (2008). I will use the term in a similarly loose manner here, while 
recognizing that the term may be more or less apt for different forms of user-based 
involvement in land use planning. See Jennifer Shkabatur, Cities @ Crossroads: Digital 
Technology and Local Democracy in America, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1413, 1443-44 (2011) 
(defining “governmental crowdsourcing” as “the process of outsourcing certain 
governmental functions to the broad public, and soliciting back services, suggestions, 
solutions, and ideas”). The idea of crowdsourcing builds on ideas that were recently 
popularized in, for example, JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004); a 
much earlier antecedent is the Condorcet Jury Theorem. See, e.g., Matthew C. 
Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 
1462-63 (2011) (citing Marquis de Condorcet, Essay on the Application of Mathematics 
to the Theory of Decision-Making (1785), reprinted in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 
33 (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976)).  
 3 See, e.g., Daren C. Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation 
Process for Planning Projects, 8 PLANNING THEORY 242 (2009); Shkabatur, supra note 
2, at 1472-76; Jennifer S. Evans-Cowley, There’s an App for That: Mobile Applications 
for Urban Planning (Oct. 29, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1951069; see also Patricia E. Salkin, Social Networking and 
Land Use Planning and Regulation: Practical Benefits, Pitfalls, and Ethical 
Considerations, 31 PACE L. REV. 54 (2011); Julie A. Tappendorf, To Tweet or Not to 
Tweet: Use of Social Networking in Land Use Planning and Regulation, 34 ZONING AND 
LAND PLANNING LAW REPORT, no. 5, May 2012, at 1. Land use planning is just one area 
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shortfalls,4 finding better ways to aggregate the information 
dispersed among various members of the public seems like a 
promising strategy.5  
Without question, technological advances can 
dramatically reduce the cost of informational inputs into land 
use coordination. But the usefulness of these inputs depends on 
the theoretical and institutional frameworks within which they 
are employed.6 By drawing connections between emerging 
information technologies and the chronic information problems 
that produce land use conflicts, it becomes possible to 
reimagine the government’s role in land use coordination. This 
essay makes a start on that project.  
Two points bear emphasis at the outset. First, land use 
decisionmaking is already “crowdsourced” in important ways—
at least if the term is read broadly to include all aggregations of 
widely dispersed information. Citizens provide informational 
inputs into land use control through market decisions,7 political 
  
in which crowdsourcing and related public engagement approaches might be employed 
by governmental entities. See generally Shkabatur, supra note 2; William D. Eggers & 
Rob Hamill, Five Ways Crowdsourcing Can Transform the Public Sphere, GOVERNING 
(May 23, 2012), http://www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/col-government-
crowdsourcing-five-models.html (describing a variety of crowdsourcing initiatives); 
David Lepeska, Coming Soon: Twitter as a Citywide Suggestions Box, NEXT AM. CITY, 
(Oct. 1, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://americancity.org/daily/entry/coming-soon-twitter-as-city-
suggestions-box. 
 4 The Coase Theorem holds that parties will bargain to an efficient solution 
in the absence of transaction costs. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 8 (1960). Information problems—whether private information about 
valuations that enables strategic behavior or a simple lack of knowledge about 
potential uses and their impacts—contribute greatly to the costs of transacting. See 
Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 611, 
615-16 (1989).  
 5 The idea of making use of dispersed information appears prominently in 
President Obama’s 2009 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies on Transparency and Open Government: “Knowledge is widely dispersed in 
society, and public officials benefit from having access to that dispersed knowledge.” 
Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009), cited 
and discussed in Shkabatur, supra note 2, at 1443. 
 6 Likewise, institutional design should be informed by the costs and 
incentives surrounding information acquisition and use. See generally Stephenson, 
supra note 2. For a critical look at the enthusiasm surrounding “many minds” models, 
and some helpful distinctions among them, see Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds 
Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2009).  
 7 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Information and Economic Behavior, in 4 
COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 136, 140 
(1984) (“From the viewpoint of the society as a whole, prices are signals by which 
information about scarcities is transmitted among the members of society.”); F.A. 
Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526-28 (1945) 
(emphasizing the ability of the price system to aggregate dispersed information and 
successfully channel the use of resources). 
2013] CROWDSOURCING LAND USE 387 
 
participation,8 Tieboutian sorting,9 and responses to a variety of 
governmentally constructed choices.10 The institution of 
property itself delegates agenda-setting to owners11 and thereby 
widely disperses decisionmaking over the use of land. 
Governmental bodies have also tried for decades to spur direct 
public engagement in land use decisionmaking.12 What is new, 
then, is not the idea of aggregating dispersed information, but 
rather the prospect of combining technological and theoretical 
advances to do so in novel and powerful ways.  
Second, the law’s role in the land use arena extends 
beyond information collection and aggregation. Government 
must get involved in land use decisionmaking not only because 
private mechanisms do not (yet) exist to reliably aggregate and 
deploy information, but also because society’s normative 
commitments place constraints on the sorts of preferences and 
  
 8 See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 15-20 (1970) 
(contrasting political participation (“voice”) with market decisions (“exit”)). 
 9 See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 
J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). Tiebout analogized the choice among local governments to a 
shopping trip; residents sort themselves into jurisdictions by selecting the bundles of 
taxes and services that best match their preferences. See id. at 422.  
 10 For example, taxes, subsidies, liability rules, and tradable permits all 
present agents with choices that both influence behavior and harness information. See, 
e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An 
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725 (1996) (discussing the information-
harnessing properties of liability rules). 
 11 See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 275, 289-93 (2008) (presenting the idea of owners as “agenda setters”); 
Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1728, 1754-55 
(2004) (discussing property as delegation). 
 12 See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in 
Urban Renewal, 29 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 242 (1963). A variety of creative 
participatory techniques have been used, many of which do not depend on advanced 
technology. See, e.g., STEFANO DI GESSA ET AL., INT’L LAND COAL., PARTICIPATORY 
MAPPING AS A TOOL FOR EMPOWERMENT 21 (2009), available at 
http://www.landcoalition.org/publications/participatory-mapping-tool-empowerment 
(describing a project that involved the public in creating physical three-dimensional 
maps in the Philippines); Andrew Leonard, House’s Collaboration Cart Puts 
Community Planning on the Street, GRIST (Nov. 20, 2011), http://grist.org/cities/2011-
11-20-houses-collaboration-cart-puts-community-planning-on-the-street (describing a 
physical cart containing tools for collecting public reactions, and a park renovation 
project in New York’s Chinatown in which residents were encouraged to write or draw 
their ideas and wishes on paper lanterns); Oversized Cake Gets NDG Residents 
Talking, CBC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/ 
story/2011/11/18/mtl-cake.html (chocolate cake replica of a neighborhood placed 
alongside a table “where passing people could write their hopes for the 
neighbourhood”); see also James Brasuell, Draft Burbank General Plan is Both 
Adorable and Progressive, CURBED LA (Mar. 30, 2012), http://la.curbed.com/archives/ 
2012/03/proposed_burbank_general_plan_is_both_adorable_and_progressive.php 
(discussing Burbank’s use of an avatar known as “Planner Andy” to “help crowdsource 
ideas about how residents view their city,” and Burbank’s suggestion that Andy be 
printed out and photographed around the city). 
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projects that may be pursued. No amount of crowdsourcing can 
remove governmental responsibility over certain normative 
objectives, such as countering discrimination. This observation 
places limits on the use of new information aggregation tools, 
but it does not mean that these tools present unusual or unique 
risks. On the contrary, a conscious focus on crowdsourcing may 
usefully pull apart normative and empirical questions that have 
been conflated in existing land use decision processes and place 
new emphasis on the government’s normative obligations. 
The essay proceeds in two steps. Part I connects past 
theoretical work to three types of information that technology 
can make more affordable: land use impacts as they exist on the 
ground, landowners’ future plans, and preferences for patterns of 
land use. Part II examines how government’s role in coordinating 
land uses might shift away from top-down regulation and toward 
the design of platforms for collecting and using information.13 This 
analysis suggests a revised understanding of local governments 
as information collectors, aggregators, brokers, and managers 
who are also charged with pursuing certain normative goals.  
I. INFORMATION SHORTFALLS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
Land use inefficiencies largely boil down to information 
failures.14 Information about land use intentions, impacts, and 
valuations is fragmented among a multitude of owners and 
other constituents who are distributed across time and space. If 
bargaining were costless, this dispersed information would be 
automatically aggregated in the process of making land use 
deals.15 The result would be an efficient set of spatial and 
temporal adjacencies and use patterns. Perfect insurance 
markets would allow actors to hedge their bets in ways that 
would make them risk neutral, eradicating NIMBYism—at 
  
 13 See Shkabatur, supra note 2, at 1460-63 (citing Tim O’Reilly, Government 
as a Platform, in OPEN GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND 
PARTICIPATION IN PRACTICE 11, 13 (Daniel Lathrop & Laurel Ruma eds., 2010)) 
(discussing and critiquing the view of government as “platform provider” that has 
emerged in the context of digital initiatives); see also infra Part II.  
 14 This follows from the large role that information costs play in raising the 
costs of transactions and in generating strategic behavior. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra 
note 4, at 615-16. 
 15 See generally Coase, supra note 4. A primary impediment to the efficient 
resolution of land use conflicts is strategic behavior that stems from private 
information about reservation prices. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Property Rights 
Doctrine and Demand Revelation Under Incomplete Information, in 4 ARROW, supra 
note 7, at 216-18; Ellickson, supra note 4, at 616 n.25. 
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least to the extent that actors are free of irrational prejudices.16 
In a world of zero transaction costs, property rights in all land 
uses and their impacts could be established and perfectly 
priced; all potential land use conflicts could be instantly sorted 
out to an efficient resolution.17  
In the real world, landowners need institutional help in 
coordinating their uses. Spatial adjacencies have traditionally 
been managed through some mix of nuisance law, zoning, and 
covenants. These tools implicitly or explicitly proceed from 
empirical judgments about impacts, preferences, and future 
plans. For example, residential uses are separated from 
commercial uses on the assumption that impacts emanating 
from the latter will negatively affect the former. As debates 
over mixed-use districts suggest, however, these judgments are 
open to question.18  
Temporal adjacencies raise analogous but distinct 
issues, and managing them also requires empirical judgments 
and predictions. Trusts and the doctrine of waste offer different 
models for reconciling the interests of successive possessors.19 
The fee simple estate, which extends forward indefinitely in 
time, might be expected to obviate concerns about temporal 
spillovers: any negative effects on the land should show up in 
resale values.20 Information problems remain, however. 
  
 16 NIMBY is a well-known acronym for “not in my backyard.” To say that full 
information would make NIMBYism unproblematic is not to say that everyone would 
want everything in their own backyards all the time. Rather, decisions would be based 
on the expected value of impacts, and positive-value projects would get optimally placed 
rather than excluded altogether. In other words, YIMBYs (“yes in my backyard” types) 
would balance out NIMBYs—at least to the extent that a given project is a worthwhile one 
and actors are rational. The possibility that irrational prejudices could persist even in a 
world of costless bargaining connects to the problem of illegitimate preferences. 
 17 For example, one landowner might own the right to play music at a certain 
level or another landowner might hold an entitlement not to be subjected to decibels 
above a certain level, with exceptions and refinements costlessly negotiated. An 
efficient resolution might or might not be a normatively attractive one. Not only could 
there be unwanted distributive effects in some efficient resolutions, there are some 
preferences (such as racial prejudices) that for normative reasons should not be 
vindicated, regardless of willingness to pay. Addressing these concerns requires a 
continuing governmental role in land use control, beyond merely overcoming 
information shortfalls. See infra Part II.  
 18 See, e.g., NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, 
POLICING, AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 64-76 (2010) (discussing Jane 
Jacobs’s view that increased informal surveillance in mixed-use areas would lead to 
lower crime rates and empirical work suggesting otherwise, as well as the possibility 
that there are improvements in quality of life not captured in the crime statistics).  
 19 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 216-18 (7th ed. 2010).  
 20 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. 
ECON. REV., no. 2, 1967, at 347, 355 (describing a private landowner as “a broker whose 
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Efficient shifts in land use over time often require changes in 
the physical scope or scale of ownership—it may be necessary 
to assemble land into larger tracts or disassemble it into 
smaller parcels. Achieving these reconfigurations can present 
difficult bargaining dynamics, given the existence of private 
information about reservation prices. These problems cannot be 
forestalled ex ante without accurately predicting future 
efficient scales;21 they cannot be addressed coercively ex post (as 
through eminent domain) without confronting serious 
valuation problems.22  
For all these reasons, better information can improve 
the management of land use adjacencies. But there are two 
problems. First, information is notoriously costly and should 
not be acquired beyond the point where it produces net 
marginal gains.23 Second, some types of information can impede 
rather than ease bargaining; knowing more about a situation 
may enable parties to behave strategically, or it may offer them 
ammunition for interpreting facts in ways favorable to their 
own interests.24 The emergence of new technologies that lower 
the cost of acquiring information would be expected to shift the 
efficient level of information acquisition upward, but 
information acquisition must be coupled with theoretical 
advances that make information useful and that sidestep self-
interested behavior. Technological and theoretical advances 
must be considered in tandem, then, to usefully transform land 
use decision processes.  
  
wealth depends on how well he takes into account the competing claims of the present 
and the future”). 
 21 See Larissa Katz, Red Tape and Gridlock, 23 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 
99, 120-21 (2010) (challenging the idea that we can identify a resource’s “ideal use” in 
advance and arrange property rights to achieve it). 
 22 As has been well noted, owners may assign a subjective value to their 
property that is well in excess of its market value. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 83 (1986). There have been many 
efforts to design mechanisms that would uncover or approximate owners’ subjective 
values, but the problem remains a very difficult one.  
 23 George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 224 
(1961) (“Ignorance is like subzero weather: by a sufficient expenditure its effects upon 
people can be kept within tolerable or even comfortable bounds, but it would be wholly 
uneconomic entirely to eliminate all its effects.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 142, 161-62 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. 
McChesney eds., 2003) (explaining how bargaining in the context of oil unitization can 
be more successful at an earlier stage when less information is known and parties do 
not know whether a given formula will work to their advantage or disadvantage); 
Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of 
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997) (discussing the impact of self-
serving bias on bargaining dynamics). 
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The sections below show how addressing three types of 
information shortfalls might produce gains that have been 
outlined in existing theoretical work. First, information about 
impacts could support a shift from a land use control system 
that focuses on use classifications or inputs to one that focuses 
on impacts or outcomes. Second, information about intentions 
could build more “precaution” into land use choices, as through 
the increased use of options to coordinate land use ex ante.25 
Third, information about desired use patterns can support 
innovations that harness interdependent decisionmaking and 
address associational spillovers.  
A. Land Use Impacts 
Zoning decisions proceed on assumptions about the 
impacts of various land uses on other land uses. Presumed 
land-on-land spillovers form a primary rationale for separating 
uses or for privileging particularly sensitive uses, such as single-
family residences. Likewise, housing code enforcement and 
police priorities are often driven by assumptions about the 
effects of certain kinds of violations and conditions on quality of 
life.26 Land use regulation usually proceeds by ruling out 
categories of uses or requiring particular property 
configurations, such as minimum setbacks. Yet the actual 
impacts of particular uses and configurations are often 
unknown—at least to local government officials and in-movers. 
Not only could such information improve traditional use-based 
zoning, it could also support performance zoning that is 
directly based on land use impacts.27  
  
 25 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORT L., no. 
2, at 1 (2011). 
 26 The “broken windows” hypothesis, which has been challenged empirically, 
embodies some of these assumptions. See, e.g., GARNETT, supra note 18, at 21-26.  
 27 Although the term “performance zoning” covers a range of approaches, the 
basic idea involves relying less on use categories and more on actual impacts. See, e.g., 
JANE JACOBS, DARK AGE AHEAD 153-57 (2004) (discussing advantages of a 
“performance code” that addresses concerns about noises, odors, traffic, and other 
impacts); DOUGLAS R. PORTER ET AL., FLEXIBLE ZONING: HOW IT WORKS 11 (1988) 
(“Theoretically, in a regulatory system based solely on performance standards, any use 
could locate adjacent to any other use, provided that it could satisfy the criteria and 
standards contained in the ordinance.”); Frederick W. Acker, Note, Performance 
Zoning, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363 (1991) (explaining the rationale for performance 
zoning and comparing proposals). One challenge in implementing performance 
standards is the difficulty of monitoring for violations. Martin Jaffe, Performance 
Zoning: A Reassessment, 45 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Mar. 1993, at 3, 4 (discussing 
this problem in the context of industrial performance controls).  
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Zoners and planners are not entirely in the dark about 
impacts. Hedonic regression analysis can measure the effects of 
particular uses—from wind turbines to community gardens—
on neighboring property values.28 Grounding land use decisions 
in these data represents a considerable advance over 
proceeding by intuition. But the results can be complicated by 
the fact that property values are based on expectations about 
impacts, rather than the impacts themselves. Moreover, the 
expectations in question are not only those held by buyers, but 
also those that buyers imagine third parties hold.29 Once the 
risk aversion that typically accompanies residential ownership 
is added to the mix,30 the discount associated with a particular 
land use may diverge considerably from that use’s actual 
effects on consumption utility.  
The current level of governmental ignorance about 
impacts is not inevitable. It could be overcome by harnessing 
information that already exists, dispersed in the hands of the 
public. People residing within, commuting through, or just 
visiting a jurisdiction collectively possess a lot of information 
about land uses and conditions within the jurisdiction, 
including details about the intensity and prevalence of certain 
uses, and their effects on quality of life. Some questions, such 
as the noise levels produced by certain kinds of machinery and 
the degree to which the noise interferes with different sorts of 
activities, are matters on which knowledgeable individuals 
across the country or around the world may have insight.  
Finding ways to obtain the scattered information these 
sources possess is a challenge, but one that might be 
approached with some optimism. Consumers volunteer 
enormous amounts of information about their experiences with 
  
 28 See, e.g., DENISE DIPASQUALE & WILLIAM C. WHEATON, URBAN ECONOMICS 
AND REAL ESTATE MARKETS 189-90 (1996) (describing the hedonic approach to valuing 
housing attributes and describing some difficulties associated with using it); Vicki 
Been & Ioan Voicu, The Effect of Community Gardens on Neighboring Property Values, 
36 REAL ESTATE ECON. 241 (2008); Yasin Sunak & Reinhard Madlener, The Impact of 
Wind Farms on Property Values: A Geographically Weighted Hedonic Pricing Model 
(Future Energy Consumer Needs & Behavior, Working Paper No. 03/2012, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2114216 (applying a hedonic pricing model to 
determine the effects of wind farms on property values in western Germany). 
 29 The problem is familiar to anyone who has studied stock market bubbles. 
John Maynard Keynes famously described the stock market as a beauty contest in 
which participants are asked not who they find most beautiful but who they expect 
everyone else to find most beautiful. See David Kestenbaum, Ranking Cute Animals: A 
Stock Market Experiment, NPR PLANET MONEY (Jan. 14, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/01/04/132906135/ranking-cute-animals-a-stock-
market-experiment (describing an experiment based on Keynes’s insight).  
 30 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 9-12 (2001). 
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products and services, including location-specific reactions to 
hotels, apartments, parks, and even neighborhoods.31 This 
information is not presently elicited or aggregated in a way 
that is likely to be very useful for land use control purposes.32 
But it could be.  
What is necessary are a set of conditions that both 
enable and motivate people who possess the relevant 
information to reveal it. Providing the ability to contribute 
information, which requires developing and distributing 
appropriate technologies, is likely the easier part of the equation 
to solve. Some localities, nonprofits, and entrepreneurs have 
already begun experimenting with smartphone apps that allow 
people to report observed problems like potholes or 
malfunctioning streetlamps on the fly. Perhaps the best known 
of these is the SeeClickFix smartphone app used by a number of 
local governments, modeled on the earlier FixMyStreet app 
developed in the United Kingdom.33 Other apps, such as 
Widenoise, are designed to monitor localized conditions—in this 
case, ambient noise levels.34 Similar in spirit are kite 
photography programs for recording local conditions35 and 
“Bucket Brigade” initiatives that allow citizens to collect and 
report real-time, localized air quality results.36 
While these approaches represent only early examples 
of how land use data collection might proceed, they 
  
 31 See, e.g., APARTMENTRATINGS, http://www.apartmentratings.com (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2012); TRIPADVISOR, http://www.tripadvisor.com (last visited Sept. 5, 
2012); YELP, http://www.yelp.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). 
 32 Indeed, confusion about the subject of discussion appears to reign in some 
online fora. For example, one review in Yelp’s listing for Chicago’s Lincoln Park began, 
“Is this a review of an entire neighborhood or just for the parks?” Jim O’s Review, 
Lincoln Park, YELP (June 11, 2009), http://www.yelp.com/biz/lincoln-park-chicago# 
hrid:-oewnWvOIz4wNgfQ31gIBA.  
 33 FIXMYSTREET, http://www.fixmystreet.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2012); 
SEECLICKFIX, http://www.seeclickfix.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2012); see also Shkabatur, 
supra note 2, at 1447-48 (discussing these and similar apps). Another variation on this 
theme is BlightStatus, an app that allows citizens in New Orleans to report, and track 
governmental responses to, blighted conditions. See Emily Badger, Revitalizing New 
Orleans by Crowdsourcing Renewal, CO.EXIST (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://www.fastcoexist.com/1680759/revitalizing-new-orleans-by-crowdsourcing-renewal. 
 34 See WideNoise, Ever Heard of Sound Pollution?, EVERYAWARE, 
http://cs.everyaware.eu/event/widenoise (last visited Feb. 21, 2013); see also Evans-
Cowley, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing Widenoise and the potential that such a 
“[p]articipatory sensing” application could improve land use planning).  
 35 See, e.g., Martijn de Waal, How Kite Photography Can Empower Local 
Communities, MOBILE CITY (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.themobilecity.nl/2011/ 
10/19/how-kite-photography-can-empower-local-communities/. 
 36 LOUISIANA BUCKET BRIGADE, http://www.labucketbrigade.org (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2012). 
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demonstrate the potential of new technologies to collect, in real 
time, broadly dispersed information related to land use. A set 
of impact indexes might be developed to which the public could 
be invited to contribute both qualitative and quantitative 
information. Contributions might be actively solicited from 
those who live near a given use or commute past it.37 Of course, 
the challenge of achieving optimal levels of participation 
remains—a point that will be discussed further below.38  
We might also worry about the accuracy and 
representativeness of the information submitted. This concern 
is heightened when some of the people in the best position to 
know about a given impact also have a vested interest in the 
magnitude of that impact. These interests might cut in 
different directions. For example, a homeowner poised to sell 
might want to understate the impact of the cheese factory next 
door, while a long-time resident who is lobbying to get the 
factory shut down might want to overstate its impact. Concerns 
about biased feedback are nothing new, but there are some 
mechanisms for dealing with them, including reputational 
ratings.39 Moreover, in some impact contexts, information 
gathered from one community (say, about the noise level 
associated with a particular kind of turbine) can be used 
elsewhere, reducing the chance of gaming. 
Nonetheless, rollouts of new impact-detecting apps must 
be carefully managed to reduce the risk of systematic biases. 
For example, we might not expect people who are early 
adopters of a noise-detecting app to be representative along the 
dimension of noise tolerance, nor would we expect them to be 
evenhanded in choosing when to measure impacts. As a first 
cut, a governmental body could wait until it has collected 
commitments from a cross-section of the population to 
participate in an impact-gathering program before launching 
it. Alternatively, local governments might consider relatively 
localized pilot projects involving proprietary governmental 
  
 37 Local governments have developed mapping programs based on 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology to study commuting patterns. Such 
applications may make it possible to identify people who are likely to commute along a 
given pathway. See, e.g., Eric Coumou, ESRI Map Book Gallery Vol. 22: Carson Valley 
Employment and Housing, http://www.esri.com/mapmuseum/mapbook_gallery/volume22/ 
state_local4.html; see also Evans-Cowley, supra note 3, at 5 (suggesting that people 
could volunteer to have their routes tracked and aggregated for transportation 
planning purposes). 
 38 See infra Part II.A.  
 39 See, e.g., LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION 127-29 
(2011).  
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apps (perhaps themselves the product of crowdsourcing 
initiatives) provided free of charge, along with the loaned 
hardware necessary to run them.40  
Local governments could also phase in the use of 
crowdsourced impact information, allowing it to play a larger 
role in land use policy as publicity builds and participation 
grows. For example, noise level information might first be used 
to augment other information sources in refining traditional 
zoning classifications,41 and only later be used to inform the 
development of performance standards. Moreover, performance 
zoning approaches that focus on land use impacts need not be 
adopted as a stand-alone replacement for existing public land 
use controls. They can instead be layered onto Euclidian zoning 
as an additional constraint,42 made part of a process through 
which a landowner can be selectively released from existing 
land use restrictions,43 or combined with other land use control 
techniques, such as tradable permits.44  
Although these approaches lend themselves most 
obviously to the control of spillovers, impact information could 
also be used in other ways to improve the quality of the built 
environment. If different environments affect people’s 
subjective well-being in systematic ways, then the aggregation 
of information about these hedonic impacts could usefully 
inform both private and governmental land use choices. If the 
government learns, for example, that curved residential streets 
make people happier than grids (or vice versa), it can use that 
  
 40 Approaches based on the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) used in 
hedonics, which prompts people at random times throughout the day to report results, 
could be used to counter selectivity in the timing of impact measurement. See JOEL M. 
HEKTNER ET AL., EXPERIENCE SAMPLING METHOD: MEASURING THE QUALITY OF 
EVERYDAY LIFE 6-7 (2007) (describing the ESM and noting some limitations and 
drawbacks, including the fact that it can be expensive to implement).  
 41 Cf. Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal: “Dead Zones” and Toxic Death 
Risk Index Taxes, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 779-84 (1992) (discussing how performance 
standards might be used in conjunction with Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
programs to calculate optimal buffer zones around hazardous waste sites).  
 42 See Robert J. Blackwell, Comment, Overlay Zoning, Performance 
Standards, and Environmental Protection After Nollan, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
615, 637-39 (1989); see also generally LANE KENDIG ET AL., PERFORMANCE ZONING 
(1980) (presenting a performance zoning proposal that combines use districts with 
performance standards). 
 43 See Anita P. Miller, Rural Development Considerations for Growth 
Management, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 781, 789-91 (2003) (describing such an approach 
in Rio Arriba County, New Mexico).  
 44 See John R. Ottensmann, Market-Based Exchanges of Rights Within a 
System of Performance Zoning, 1(1) PLAN. & MARKETS (1998), available at http://www-
pam.usc.edu/volume1/v1i1a4s1.html. 
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information as an input into street design or make the data 
available to private developers or consumers.45  
B. Land Use Intentions 
A second area of land use ignorance involves intentions. 
Neighbors, prospective in-movers, and governmental bodies 
often lack insight into what landowners intend to do with their 
properties in the future.46 It is useful to pinpoint the source of 
this uncertainty. A system of land use control that is both 
flexible enough to adapt to changes in conditions and broadly 
framed enough to accommodate heterogeneity among owners 
will usually build some unused capacity into most landowners’ 
entitlements. Thus, most landowners have some ability to 
engage in uses that are a bit more intense or that fill a 
somewhat larger proportion of the three-dimensional envelope 
that defines their spatial claim. They might, for example, be able 
to build a second-story addition, grow a row of Sequoia trees, 
start a small in-home day care center, or kennel a pack of 
hunting dogs in the backyard. These dormant options can make 
it difficult for neighbors and potential in-movers (or out-movers) 
to predict future uses. And they can make it difficult for zoners 
and planners to coordinate land uses over time. 
Ignorance about intentions heightens the potential for 
costly land use conflicts. A few primary strategies presently 
exist for reducing the resulting uncertainty, each of which has 
drawbacks of its own. First, local governments already 
incentivize the disclosure of future plans when they grant 
vested rights or other dispensations as projects move toward 
actualization.47 Requiring affirmative steps toward realizing 
  
 45 We might wonder why consumers are not already demanding design 
choices that make them happier. The answer, explored in more detail in Part I.C, may 
be that revealed preferences in the marketplace (or in the Tieboutian analog of a 
marketplace) can only respond to available options. Existing options in turn may be 
shaped by a variety of factors, including path dependence. See, e.g., Robert C. 
Ellickson, The Law and Economics of Street Layouts: How a Grid Pattern Benefits a 
Downtown, 64 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2152442 (discussing path dependence and other considerations relevant to 
street layout choices, including potential tradeoffs between aesthetics and the 
advantages of a grid system). 
 46 To be sure, the owners themselves may often lack this insight as well. But 
owners as a group collectively possess more information about land use intentions than 
do those who are charged with making land use policy.  
 47 See generally Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land 
Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222 (2009) (describing and critiquing protections 
for existing uses and vested rights).  
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one’s intentions before those intentions will be protected does 
help to screen for sincerity.48 But this requirement also creates 
unwanted pressures towards rushed development.49 Protecting 
uses only as they become reality is an information-forcing 
device, but it is also a development-forcing device.  
Narrowing the band of possible uses through zoning or 
other land use controls is another way that local governments 
can render land use more predictable. As suggested already, 
uncertainty about land use intentions is a function of the gap 
between present uses and permitted uses. If that gap is 
completely regulated away, the actual use becomes the 
maximum use, and uncertainty is removed. Somewhat less 
extreme versions of this strategy can be seen in very finely 
grained zoning classifications that, for example, divide two-
family homes from three-family homes, and small apartment 
buildings from somewhat larger ones. This approach tends 
toward regulatory overkill; narrowing the permissible uses in a 
given area may rule out uses that would have been efficient to 
introduce. Zoning restrictions can be loosened to address this 
concern,50 but making zoning more flexible undermines any 
certainty that might follow from having the narrow zoning 
restrictions in the first place.51  
Another approach to uncertainty about intentions 
involves direct dealmaking among landowners to remove the 
potential for unexpected or unwanted land use changes. Such 
dealmaking often occurs on a large, developer-mediated scale 
in private residential communities. The webs of covenants that 
residents buy into take the narrow zoning classification 
strategy described above to a new level. Not only may 
permissible uses be defined at a much finer grain than in the 
typical zoned neighborhood, the covenants may be more 
difficult to alter.52 Yet again, the rigidity comes at a price, 
  
 48 See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 1391 (2009) (discussing various mechanisms that the law uses to 
identify sincere or intensely held preferences). 
 49 See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 47, at 1283.  
 50 Landowners can, for example, seek variances or attempt to have an area 
rezoned; the applicable legal standards will determine how easy or difficult these 
moves will be.  
 51 Performance zoning, discussed in Part I.A., supra, could help to blunt the 
effects of uncertainty about uses by controlling cross-border impacts. But it would not 
be able to deal well with heterogeneity in sensitivity to impacts, and so might 
overregulate or underregulate in a given situation.  
 52 Common interest communities may require a supermajority to change a 
covenant, whereas the ordinary political processes governing zoning are majoritarian.  
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especially if it imposes uniformity on a larger scale than is 
efficient. For example, banning tall trees from an entire 
neighborhood may do a good job of protecting the expectations 
of those who want sweeping views or solar panels, but it might 
also create a less interesting and pleasing community than 
would a judicious mix of open vistas and tall trees. To achieve 
more fine-grained results, individual landowners could bargain 
with each other directly to place limits on future land uses. 
Such bargaining may run aground, however, due to high search 
costs53 or bilateral monopoly dynamics.54  
What is needed—and what new information technologies 
can support—is a platform that enables landowners to find each 
other and credibly signal their intentions before any dispute 
arises between them, without anyone having to break ground on 
a given project. Although space does not permit a full description 
here, the basic idea is for a governmental body to host a kind of 
clearinghouse in which parties can buy and sell options on land 
use rights.55 For example, an owner who has no intention of 
blocking a beautiful view enjoyed by a neighboring property 
might happily transfer an option on the view rights to a 
centralized exchange, in return for a modest payment. Later, a 
neighbor who wanted to secure those view rights would be able 
to purchase them at a preset price. Platforms that enable such 
deals among private parties can also provide useful guidance to 
local governments about demand levels for different sorts of 
land use arrangements. 
Information about plans and intentions might do more 
than merely forestall conflict; it might also offer new ways to 
collaboratively enhance the value that parties derive from their 
land.56 Already, new technologies have opened up alternatives 
that were previously elusive, such as the possibility that 
  
 53 See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty 
About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1296 (2008). 
 54 See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. 
L. REV. 55, 58-59 (1987). 
 55 The approach described in the text is explored in Fennell, supra note 25. It 
is sometimes suggested that property rights allow owners themselves to serve as a kind 
of clearinghouse for the land use rights contained within their default entitlement 
bundles. Sterk, supra note 53, at 1295 (citing Smith, supra note 11, at 1728-29). High 
search costs and bilateral monopoly dynamics may make the government a better 
clearinghouse provider, as long as it can induce owners to provide the necessary 
information about what is on offer within the clearinghouse.  
 56 Of particular interest are initiatives that would facilitate the sharing of 
excess capacity. See generally Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods 
and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 
273 (2004) (explaining the role of excess capacity in social production). 
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strangers could share gardens and backyards,57 form carpools,58 
and so on. Formatting and delivering information about these 
resources to neighbors and potential in-movers could improve 
locational decisions by revealing features of the environment 
that would otherwise remain undiscovered. Homebuyers can 
see public parks on a map, but they cannot see the neighbors 
who would be interested in sharing gardening space. Interfaces 
that pool such information could also help to uncover shared 
interests and foster the kind of “multiplex” interactions that 
can help to support social norms among those already in the 
community.59 Nextdoor.com offers a social networking space 
available only to verified neighbors that might be used to 
accomplish similar goals.60  
Knowing what current landowners plan to do with their 
properties is only one part of the puzzle. Optimizing land use 
policy also requires knowing something about how demand for 
different land uses will evolve in the future as rounds of entry 
and exit occur. Information about economic, employment, and 
infrastructure factors that are likely to influence migration and 
demand patterns is helpful in this regard, and new GIS-based 
forecasting tools can help to uncover it.61 In addition, it is 
necessary to gain insight into people’s preferences for patterns 
of uses—preferences that are shaped in turn by existing use 
patterns. The next section explains.  
C. Land Use Pattern Preferences 
Economists rely on the notion of “revealed preferences”—
the idea that we can infer preferences by watching what people 
do in the marketplace when their own money is on the line. For 
two reasons, however, observing market demand for particular 
land uses may be misleading. First, land uses (as opposed to 
  
 57 See, e.g., LANDSHARE, http://www.landshare.net (last visited Sept. 10, 
2012) (online service matching would-be gardeners without land with people who have 
extra land available for gardening).  
 58 See, e.g., Mickey Meece, Car-Pooling Makes a Surge on Apps and Social 
Media, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2012, at B1 (describing the role of sites like Zimride.com 
and eRideShare.com in popularizing car-pooling and ride-sharing).  
 59 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 179 n.44 (1991). 
 60 See Randall Stross, Meet Your Neighbors, If Only Online, N.Y. TIMES (May 
12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/business/on-nextdoorcom-social-networks-
for-neighbors.html. 
 61 See, e.g., Deborah Dennison, ERSI Map Book Gallery Vol. 23: Analyzing 
U.S. Household Migration Patterns, http://www.esri.com/mapmuseum/mapbook_gallery/ 
volume23/statelocal3.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
400 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
land itself) are not the subject of free-market transactions. 
Nuisance law, zoning, and other land use controls tightly 
constrain what uses may be undertaken on particular parcels. 
While there is some ability to negotiate around existing 
restrictions, the process is not one that approximates an open 
market. Second, the only preferences that can be revealed in 
the marketplace are for things that the marketplace offers. 
Where particular patterns of land use do not yet exist, it is 
difficult to gauge demand for them.62  
To approach the point from a different angle, 
preferences for land use almost always depend on the uses that 
are proximate in time and space, given the degree to which the 
values associated with particular concurrent or successive uses 
are interdependent. Local governments do not know which 
spatial and temporal land use patterns incumbents and 
potential in-movers prefer, because governments can only 
observe binary (entry and exit) responses to existing patterns. 
Such a choice provides no information about preferences for 
alternatives that are not available, and may even contribute to 
their continued unavailability.63  
Models pioneered by Thomas Schelling establish that 
when locational decisionmaking is highly interdependent, 
patterns can become entrenched or, alternatively, can be 
sensitive to unraveling as moves beget other moves.64 Although 
Schelling’s work is most closely associated with patterns of 
racial segregation and integration, similar points might be 
made about movements prompted by other forms of 
heterogeneity or homogeneity, or by patterns of aesthetic 
elements or land use impacts. Agent-based models can 
  
 62 Not only is it impossible for unavailable alternatives to be selected, it may 
even be impossible for people to envision them fully enough to form preferences for 
them. This is part of a broader set of problems that plague future goods in general, 
where market uncertainty runs high. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, 
Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (2008) 
(arguing that market uncertainties suppress innovation in the absence of intellectual 
property protections for market experimentation); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited 
Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 9 (1974) (explaining how “the 
absence of some markets for future goods may cause others to fail” due to uncertainty, 
and discussing general problems of uncertainty due to “technological and taste shifts”).  
 63 See JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 17-20 (2007) (presenting 
an example in which two cities fail to offer an alternative that a substantial minority 
would prefer, yet the situation is at an equilibrium); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, 
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 146 (1978) (“People who have to choose between 
polarized extremes—a white neighborhood or a black . . . —will often choose in the way 
that reinforces the polarization.”).  
 64 See SCHELLING, supra note 63, at 147-66.  
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simulate patterns of change over time based on particular 
conditions and strategies.65 Crowdsourcing could be combined 
with these dynamic models in at least three ways.  
First, and most simply, new information technologies 
could inform the assumptions plugged into agent-based models. 
For example, designing a Schelling-type simulation requires 
knowing something about preferences for neighbors, and when 
moves will be initiated. There are some existing mechanisms 
for gathering this information,66 but new technologies offer 
flexible opportunities to expand the pool of data and obtain 
more fine-grained information about the geographic 
distribution of preferences within a metropolitan area.  
Second, “the crowd” could become involved in 
multiplayer simulations online that are designed to test the 
effects of particular changes in land use patterns.67 While most 
agent-based models employ simulated agents that follow 
particular rules in the manner indicated above, the rise of 
massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) suggests 
another possibility—involving actual people in online 
interactive simulations. A research group organized under the 
name The Responsive City has initiated some interesting work 
along these lines,68 including an online design game;69 a broader 
research initiative, World of Citycraft, appears to now be 
  
 65 See, e.g., MICHAEL BATTY, CITIES AND COMPLEXITY: UNDERSTANDING 
CITIES WITH CELLULAR AUTOMATA, AGENT-BASED MODELS, AND FRACTALS 209-16 
(2005); Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1019, 1023-29.  
 66 See, e.g., Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Processes of Racial Residential 
Segregation, in URBAN INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR CITIES 217, 233-64 (Alice 
O’Connor et al. eds., 2001) (describing “show card” methodology for eliciting 
preferences about neighborhood racial composition and presenting results of a multi-
city study); Maria Krysan et al., Does Race Matter in Neighborhood Preferences? 
Results from a Video Experiment, 115 AM. J. SOC. 527 (2009) (presenting the results of 
a study examining differences in ratings of neighborhoods based on video vignettes, 
where all neighborhood features were held constant except the races of the people 
appearing in the vignette).  
 67 Urban simulations have a long history, reaching back into the 1950s. See 
Igor Mayer et al., Beyond SimCity: Urban Gaming and Multi-Actor Systems, in MODEL 
TOWN: USING URBAN SIMULATION IN NEW TOWN PLANNING 168, 169-71 (2009) 
(providing a succinct history). For some relatively early treatments, see generally 
Richard L. Meier, “Game” Procedure in the Simulation of Cities, in THE URBAN 
CONDITION: PEOPLE AND POLICY IN THE METROPOLIS 348 (Leonard J. Duhl ed., 1963); 
JOHN L. TAYLOR, INSTRUCTIONAL PLANNING SYSTEMS: A GAMING-SIMULATION 
APPROACH TO URBAN PROBLEMS (1971).  
 68 See TReC—The Responsive City, www.theresponsivecity.org (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2012). 
 69 See Ekim Tan & Juval Portugali, The Responsive City Design Game, in 
COMPLEXITY THEORIES OF CITIES HAVE COME OF AGE 369 (Juval Portugali et al. eds., 2012). 
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underway.70 Similarly, Mojang and UN Habitat used the 
popular Minecraft platform as a foundation for their new Block 
by Block project, which allows residents to collaborate in 
virtual space over potential changes to the surrounding area.71  
Third, and most ambitiously, online interfaces could be 
used to get potential owners and land users to conditionally 
commit to particular courses of action, contingent on others 
agreeing to do the same. Antecedents of this approach include 
“money-back” guarantees for contributions to public goods72 
and, more generally, the idea of contingent markets.73 The 
ability to execute binding property instruments—covenants 
and easements capable of running with the land—would be 
necessary elements of this approach. As such, a workable 
conditional commitment interface would require considerable 
institutional support. Yet it also represents one of the most 
exciting possibilities for making use of distributed information 
about preferences to construct alternatives that do not 
presently exist.  
II. LAND USE CONTROL AS PLATFORM DESIGN 
At least one commentator has suggested that new 
technologies could profoundly alter, if not eliminate altogether, 
the role of land use planners.74 The examples above might seem 
  
 70 See World of Citycraft Wins “Kom Je Ook?” 6, TREC, 
http://www.theresponsivecity.org/2010/11/02/woc-world-of-citycraft/ (last visited Sept. 
19, 2012). The name echoes that of the popular MMOG, World of Warcraft.  
 71 Carl Manneh, Mojang and UN Presents: Block by Block, MOJANG (Sept. 5, 
2012), http://www.mojang.com/2012/09/mojang-and-un-presents-block-by-block/. The Block 
by Block project originated in the Mina Kvarter (“My Blocks”) project launched by Svensk 
Byggtjänst (Swedish Building Services) to address outdated housing projects in Sweden. 
See Carl Manneh, Minecraft Empowers People to Change Their Block, MOJANG (Oct. 27, 
2011), http://www.mojang.com/2011/10/minecraft-empowers-people-to-change-their-block/.  
 72 See Robyn M. Dawes et al., Organizing Groups for Collective Action, 80 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 1171, 1172 (1986) (describing the successful use of a “money back 
guarantee device” by The Association of Oregon Faculties in raising the lump sum 
necessary to hire a lobbyist—“a public good for all faculty members because any pay 
increases he produced would go to all faculty in the system”). For a recent analysis of 
the potential uses and limits of such money-back guarantees, see generally Julia Y. 
Lee, Gaining Assurances, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1137. 
 73 See Arrow, supra note 62, at 9 (“Instead of letting uncertainty ruin existing 
markets, we can take it explicitly into account by buying and selling commitments to be 
carried out only if some uncertain event occurs.”). Although Arrow uses the example of a 
“conceivable technological innovation” as the uncertain event, the uncertain event might 
instead be the collected commitments of a number of other local residents or landowners.  
 74 See John D. Landis, A Brave and Better World? The iPad and the Future of 
Planning, PLANETIZEN (Feb. 7, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://www.planetizen.com/node/54337 
(discussing the possibility that algorithms could eventually perform many of the tasks 
that planners now perform).  
2013] CROWDSOURCING LAND USE 403 
 
to raise the question of whether ongoing government 
involvement will be necessary at all. If we understand land use 
inefficiencies as largely stemming from information failures, 
and if government involvement serves only as a stand-in for 
the bargains that would automatically aggregate that 
information,75 then efficient information aggregation 
technologies might appear capable of usurping public land use 
controls altogether. Might not the dominant form of “post-
zoning” land use control be generated by the public at large, 
once the appropriate (and appropriately crowdsourced) apps 
have been developed?  
Yes and no. It is not hard to predict that emerging 
technologies will increase the degree to which dispersed 
information is used in land use decisionmaking. When the cost 
of an input goes down, more of that input will be demanded, and 
there is no reason to expect a different result where information 
is involved. At the same time, governmental entities will retain 
a critically important role in designing, managing, adapting, and 
refining appropriately scaled platforms for aggregating and 
using this information.76 The discussion below focuses on three 
facets of this design work: optimizing participation, putting 
insights from behavioral law and economics to work, and 
incorporating normative commitments.  
A. Optimizing Participation 
Crowdsourcing depends on participation. There are 
three basic challenges in optimizing that participation77: 
deciding who should count as part of the crowd, motivating 
participation at appropriate levels, and constraining the 
crowd’s influence in ways that are consistent with the local 
government’s normative commitments.78  
  
 75 See generally Coase, supra note 4. 
 76 Other commentators have used and critiqued the “platform” metaphor. 
See, e.g., Shkabatur, supra note 2, at 1460-63.  
 77 These considerations, variously enumerated, have appeared in other 
treatments of crowdsourcing. See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 2, at 278-88 (listing ten “rules 
of crowdsourcing” that include “pick the right crowd” and “offer the right incentives”); 
Vermeule, supra note 6, at 24-38 (noting concerns with “many minds” models in law, 
including the question of “whose minds,” and the need to make “many minds versus 
other values” tradeoffs).  
 78 This third point represents just one way in which information platforms 
might incorporate normative values; see also infra Part II.C.  
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1. Defining the Crowd 
The first set of design questions, tightly connected to 
questions of scale, is whose participation will be solicited. To 
begin, we must assume that there is some “deciding 
jurisdiction” that allows “the crowd’s” input to inform whatever 
land use decision that jurisdiction is contemplating. For 
example, a municipality might be deciding whether to zone 
land for low-income housing. An initial question is whether the 
municipal level offers the appropriate scale for making that 
land use decision, or whether incentive misalignments are 
already built into the scale of land use power. In the case of 
low-income housing, for example, municipalities may attempt 
to offload fiscal burdens onto neighboring jurisdictions. If such 
misalignments exist, then improving the technologies through 
which land use power is exercised may well be 
counterproductive—unless something else is done to address 
the underlying problem of scale.  
This is not a trivial concern. Land use control is a 
primary area in which local governments can offload costs onto 
other jurisdictions and behave in a manner that is detrimental 
to regional interests. Thus, some types of land use 
crowdsourcing might work too well in communicating self-
interested landowner views to local governments, creating 
political pressure for governmental actors to behave selfishly (or 
providing an excuse for doing so). Indeed, if one takes a 
sufficiently pessimistic view of the political economy of land use 
controls, it would seem better to unmoor land use 
decisionmaking from the interests of constituents,79 rather than 
to tighten those connections through new feedback mechanisms.  
There are two responses. The first is that NIMBYism 
and exclusionary land use policies have historically thrived 
without smartphones or web interfaces. Homeowner interests 
were hardly attenuated from or underrepresented in land use 
policy during the pre-Internet era. This does not tell us 
whether enhanced participation tools would make matters 
  
 79 Elsewhere I have examined one way of doing so: lowering the stake that 
homeowners (who tend to be the decisive political actors in most local jurisdictions) 
have in the portions of their home value attributable to local land use (and other 
“offsite”) decisions. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1047 (2008). For further discussion of the political influence and motivations of 
homeowners, as well as potential responses to homeowner risk aversion (including 
home equity insurance), see generally FISCHEL, supra note 30. 
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better or worse, but it does suggest something about the 
baseline from which we are working.  
The second response is that new information 
technologies could offer ways to improve the alignment 
between inputs to land use decisions and the impacts of those 
land use decisions. For example, it would be fully possible, and 
likely desirable, to allow information about particular land use 
impacts and preferences to flow from similarly situated 
landowners outside of the jurisdiction. In other words, the 
inputs used by the deciding jurisdiction need not all originate 
from within that jurisdiction. Regional information-gathering 
protocols might be developed to encourage broader-based 
participation. For example, app users located in adjacent 
jurisdictions might be allowed to participate in information-
gathering initiatives developed by the deciding jurisdiction. 
Letting the crowd self-define to a degree could capture both 
extraterritorial impacts and intensities of preferences, and could 
do so in a manner consistent with the fuzziness of jurisdictional 
boundaries as they are experienced on the ground.80  
2. Motivating the Crowd 
The question of motivation is also tricky. An initial 
question is whether people will overcome inertia to participate 
rather than free-ride on the efforts of others.81 For many, 
posting reviews or offering information to a group appears to be 
its own reward. The willingness of people to become involved in 
various “citizen scientist” initiatives similarly suggests that the 
process of gathering data may be engaging in its own right.82 
  
 80 Some creative ideas for restructuring local governance, such as Jerry 
Frug’s suggestion that people be allowed to vote extraterritorially, similarly attempt to blur 
jurisdictional boundaries. See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 
253, 323-30 (1993). Broadened participation protocols within a crowdsourcing initiative 
could offer a nonbinding and less threatening way to experiment along these lines.  
 81 See Stephenson, supra note 2, at 1464-67 (discussing the possibility that 
the potential benefits of “many minds” will be undermined by weakened incentives to 
exert effort to obtain high-quality informational signals).  
 82 See, e.g., The Great Backyard Bird Count, BIRDSOURCE.ORG, 
http://www.birdsource.org/gbbc (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (annual four-day birdcounting 
initiative co-sponsored by the Cornell Lab of Ornithology, the Audubon Society, and Bird 
Studies Canada); The Great Sunflower Project, http://www.greatsunflower.org (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2012) (backyard bee count to study pollination). These projects are 
examples of what Yochai Benkler calls “social production,” in which unused capacity is 
effectively donated to collaborative endeavors. Critical to the success of these projects is 
the property of “modularity”—the ability to break down the project into chunks that 
can later be successfully aggregated. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: 
HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 100-01 (2006). For 
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Rewards for participation, such as cash payments or lotteries, 
could also address the problem of underparticipation. Property 
owners might even be given an incentive through the property 
tax system to participate in certain data collection initiatives.83 
Overparticipation might instead be a problem, 
especially where bits of information submitted by different 
people are substitutes rather than complements.84 Information 
will not be useful if its flow exceeds the receiving entity’s 
capacity to process or respond to it. For example, a recent visit 
to SeeClickFix revealed unresolved issues within the City of 
Chicago that were reported months earlier. Real-time reporting 
would be expected to taper off if users learn that their reports 
have no effect; hence, it is possible that initial 
overparticipation, followed by inadequate follow up, will 
ultimately produce underparticipation. Outfitting feedback 
mechanisms with “budget constraints” that limit the amount of 
feedback that any given individual could contribute, or that 
detect when a duplicate report is being filed, might improve the 
quality and diversity of contributions and stem concerns about 
system overload.  
3. Controlling the Crowd 
A separate issue is that inputs may not be 
representative or, worse, that they may systematically 
disregard the interests of less powerful subgroups. The District 
of Columbia’s much-lauded “Apps for Democracy” contest had 
the ring of good governance about it and indeed seemed to 
generate useful participatory ideas.85 Certainly there is 
something to be said for mechanisms that engage the public 
and induce participation in governance—and that do so in a 
  
widespread participation to be feasible, these chunks must be of a manageable size for 
individuals to contribute; this is the property of “granularity.” See id.; Benkler, supra 
note 56, at 336. 
 83 Cf. Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal 
Private Property Rights Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2043-51 (2012) 
(discussing instances in which the state allocates burdens, like keeping sidewalks free 
of snow, to private property owners to harness their unique locational advantages). 
 84 See Stephenson, supra note 2, at 1468 (“[T]he impact of dividing research 
tasks among multiple agents may depend critically on whether the types of information 
they are charged with producing are substitutes or complements.”); see also id. at 1467 
n.114 (providing a land use planning example in which different pieces of information 
would be complementary).  
 85 See APPS FOR DEMOCRACY, http://www.appsfordemocracy.org/ (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2012) (presenting a platform that local governments can use to run such 
contests and providing information about the District of Columbia’s contest).  
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way that fits with how people live and work.86 But the 
possibility that apps can become too democratic, in the sense of 
privileging majority interests, deserves attention as well. While 
discussion of participatory interfaces always includes the 
obligatory reference to the “digital divide,” it is not clear that 
disparities in computer access are ultimately the largest 
concern. Rather, the worries may largely track those that have 
been raised in the context of direct democracy: that privileging 
preference aggregation without deliberation, accountability, or 
reason-giving could allow some of the most unattractive 
motivations for policymaking to carry the day.87  
An example will help to illustrate both the concern and 
some responses to it. Gallagher v. Magner, an Eighth Circuit 
decision which was recently pending review before the 
Supreme Court,88 involved a Fair Housing Act challenge to the 
housing code enforcement practices of the City of St. Paul. 
Those practices included a “user-friendly system” that enabled 
residents to report “problem properties” that should be targeted 
for code enforcement.89 If code enforcement was undertaken to 
make it harder for landlords to offer affordable rental 
  
 86 Smartphone apps may actually add an element of fun to public 
participation. At the very least, they are more compatible with people’s busy schedules 
and short attention spans than more traditional means of public engagement, such as 
attending meetings. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE 
INTEREST AND PUBLIC ACTION 99 (1982) (“That public activities can encroach unduly on 
the modern citizen’s time is well expressed in Oscar Wilde’s objection to socialism. It 
wouldn’t work, he said, because it would take too many evenings.”). 
 87 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 
1503, 1549 (1990) (“In its substitutive form direct democracy bypasses internal 
safeguards designed to filter out or negate factionalism, prejudice, tyranny, and self-
interest.”). Condorcet himself warned of the possibility that prejudices could cause 
voters to be less than randomly accurate in their opinions, and he said that where this 
is so, a smaller sample from a more carefully selected group of people would yield 
better results. CONDORCET, supra note 2, at 62. Note, however, that some of the other 
concerns associated with direct democracy, including problems of sequential 
decisionmaking, might be alleviated by forms of participation involving more complex 
scenario-building, where participants can respond to combinations of interlinked 
elements. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Direct (Anti-) Democracy, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
311, 361-62 (2012) (giving an example in which the sequence in which different policies 
are considered proves outcome determinative).  
 88 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert. 
dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide 
whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, and, if so, 
what test should be applied to them. Id. The City of St. Paul, petitioner in the case, 
withdrew its petition just weeks before oral argument, apparently due to concerns 
about the potential effects of a ruling eliminating or weakening disparate impact 
causes of action under the Fair Housing Act. See Kevin Diaz, St. Paul Yanks Housing 
Fight from High Court, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 10, 2012, 11:51 PM), http://www.startribune.com/ 
politics/national/139138084.html.  
 89 See Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 829-30. 
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properties in the area (as was alleged in Gallagher), engaging 
the public in targeting would be troubling. On the other hand, 
code enforcement aimed at keeping landlords from shirking on 
maintenance to the detriment of their tenants would carry a 
different normative valence. Moreover, wider public 
participation might ultimately yield enough violation reports 
within well-off neighborhoods to spark a reassessment and 
potential recalibration of the stringency of the housing code 
provisions.  
* * * 
As this discussion suggests, an important goal of any 
information platform design initiative must be to engage 
participation that is appropriately scaled and representative. 
This will not typically mean maximizing participation, and 
may indeed require some rationing and gatekeeping. Thus an 
initial refinement to the open-ended notion of crowdsourcing 
involves defining and cultivating the crowd. Although getting 
participation right is crucial to the successful use of new 
hyperparticipatory technologies, it has always been a crucial (if 
often ignored) element of successful land use planning and 
control. The difference is that the new technologies bring the 
issue front and center, while the older technologies quietly 
privileged certain interests over others. Rather than viewing 
new participatory developments as presenting unique threats, 
they might well be understood as finally clarifying, and 
rendering more tractable, an aspect of land use planning that 
has always been significant.  
B. Being Behavioral 
Engaging in conscious platform design also offers local 
governments the opportunity to more closely align participation 
opportunities with the lessons of behavioral law and economics. 
The NIMBY dynamic that routinely shuts down new 
development is often associated with risk aversion, but it gains 
momentum from quirks of human cognition surrounding the 
valuation of entitlements and the framing of risk. For example, 
the gap between the price one is willing to pay to acquire an 
entitlement anew and the price one would demand to give up 
that same entitlement—whether denominated as an endowment 
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effect, loss aversion, or status quo bias—could influence the way 
that existing residents respond to proposed changes.90  
Land use decisions occur sequentially. Given 
urbanization trends, most proposed changes involve increases 
in density or intensity of use. Existing residents largely frame 
these changes as potential losses. To be sure, these losses may 
be set against some expected gains (for instance, higher density 
might promise better infrastructure or improved shopping or 
dining opportunities), but losses are weighted more heavily than 
gains. Thus, someone who currently enjoys a bucolic, low-density 
residential experience might demand a great deal more to give it 
up than she would pay to acquire it anew from a baseline of a 
denser residential experience. In addition to perceived 
asymmetries between gains and losses, consumption of a new 
residential surround may be an “experience good” whose value is 
difficult to estimate in advance.91 Without experiencing a denser, 
more walkable neighborhood first-hand, for example, people may 
tend to underrate the benefits, while overrating the advantages 
associated with an existing low-density environment.  
New information platforms offer interesting opportunities 
to align land use planning more closely with human cognition. 
Consider loss aversion, which (unlike simple risk aversion) 
makes reactions to risky outcomes highly sensitive to the 
reference point from which a change is contemplated.92 Prospect 
theory suggests that residents who find the promise of a gain 
too small to induce them to take on a risk of loss might 
nonetheless be willing to take on the same amount of risk in 
the hopes of avoiding a loss.93 Thus, whether a given change’s 
benefits are framed as a potential gain or as an opportunity to 
avoid a potential loss could make a significant difference in the 
  
 90 For an application of the endowment effect to the land use context, see, for 
example, Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or Manhattanization?: Communal 
Aesthetics in Zoning Central City Real Estate Developments, 78 B.U. L. REV. 445, 500-02 
(1998). An endowment effect is just one possible explanation of the willingness-to-
pay/willingness-to-accept gap. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, 
Willingness To Pay vs. Willingness To Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 
WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 85-96 (1993); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 194.  
 91 See generally Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. 
ECON. 311 (1970) (distinguishing goods for which information can be gleaned through 
search from those for which information must be obtained through experience). 
 92 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 277-80 (1979).  
 93 See id. at 268-69.  
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reception that the change receives.94 Participatory platforms 
that simultaneously present land use alternatives for a given 
area might help to accomplish such a reframing.  
One way in which they might do so is by suggesting the 
risks that nondevelopment poses or, put differently, the options 
that development of a certain type extinguishes. If one of the 
benefits of endorsing Development A is that it would render 
impossible Development B, a different decision dynamic is 
presented than if A and B are presented seriatim as alternatives 
not to each other, but to the status quo. Emphasizing the property 
tax implications of particular development alternatives could also 
reframe a given development choice as one that offers the chance 
to avoid a painful tax increase. At a more basic level, simply 
gathering more information about impacts and collecting reports 
from those who have experienced particular kinds of changes 
could reduce information shortfalls about the effects of those 
changes. Doing so can also help to counter loss-averse projections 
about how future buyers might view a particular change.  
New participatory platforms may thus offer more than 
participation opportunities alone. They may also offer the 
chance to more actively manage the choice sets that 
landowners and other constituents confront, and thus the way 
in which decisions are framed. I do not mean to suggest that 
engineering the way in which choices are framed is 
normatively uncontroversial.95 But it is important to bear in 
mind that existing land use decisions are made within a 
default frame that may be distortionary as well. Conscious 
recognition of the frame and its role will, at the very least, 
afford greater participation in the question of framing itself.  
C. Building In Normative Values 
Land use decisionmaking implicates some of the most 
controversial and important normative questions known to law. 
To what extent (and at what scale) should racial, ethnic, and 
socioeconomic integration be pursued, and over whose 
objections? What patterns of density and space should be 
sought? How strictly should land uses of different types be 
  
 94 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 456-58 (1981). 
 95 See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 
NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1248-69 (2005) (critiquing the manipulation of “choice frames” to 
achieve the results that a social planner views as most welfare-enhancing).  
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separated? What weights should be placed on factors like 
security, convenience, and environmental quality? How should 
locally undesirable land uses be sited? How much should a 
community’s permanence and existing character be privileged 
over opportunities for growth or increased access for 
newcomers? Under what circumstances should landowners be 
forcibly displaced from their homes and businesses?  
None of these questions can be answered without 
reference to facts as they exist on the ground, but neither can 
they be wholly answered by resort to such facts. At some point, 
facts run out and normative judgments have to be made. 
Making such normative judgments is a quintessential, 
nondelegable duty of government. At the same time, the 
promise of crowdsourcing lies in its ability to more 
meaningfully aggregate information—including information 
about preferences—that can be used to inform normative 
judgments. Distinguishing value judgments from empirical 
questions, and maintaining control over the former while 
outsourcing the latter, represent core challenges for 
governmental bodies that wish to use new information 
aggregation platforms.  
Using (unfiltered) crowdsourced information as an input 
into a decision process over which the governmental body 
retains full control may often be an appropriate alternative. In 
some instances, however, such a process may frustrate those it 
means to engage if preferences are expressed for alternatives 
that turn out to be off the table. The discourse itself may be 
unproductive or even harmful to the extent that it fails to 
incorporate the local government’s normative commitments. 
Alternatively, the local government may find its own priorities 
shifting in response to the political feedback these participatory 
exercises provide. Again, the anonymity and lack of 
deliberation associated with atomized inputs into an 
aggregated system produce real concerns.  
Another approach is to build value judgments directly 
into the interface itself, whether through weightings, side 
constraints, or otherwise. A proposal by Jonathan Nash and 
Richard Revesz in the context of emissions trading illustrates 
one way of approaching the problem.96 Efficiency gains can be 
realized through tradable emissions programs, but the fact that 
  
 96 See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: 
Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 624-61 (2001). 
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emissions can cause greater or lesser amounts of harm 
depending on how concentrated or dispersed they are in time 
and space presents a central design difficulty. Nash and Revesz 
suggested a website “preclearance” process that would block 
problematic emissions transactions while permitting other 
transactions to occur.97 Likewise, we can imagine interfaces 
that would allow users to register land use preferences (or 
engage in transactions based upon them) within a normatively 
constrained space.  
Here, we can learn from computer programs that have 
already been used to augment land use planning. Nearly 
fifteen years ago, Elise Bright detailed the operation of one 
such program, “A Land Location and Optimization Technique” 
(ALLOT).98 This computer model constructs “‘optimum’ future 
land use patterns” by combining a GIS-based system for 
finding suitable sites with land use demand predictions.99 What 
makes the system uniquely applicable to the discussion here is 
its ability to build social objectives and legal constraints into 
the weightings that are used.100 Such a program illustrates how 
local governmental units can retain their roles in setting 
normative desiderata, while still allowing room for algorithm- 
and data-driven optimization within the stated parameters. It 
also shows how the constraints themselves may reflect 
empirically questionable assumptions.  
For example, in one of the studies undertaken using the 
ALLOT model, “the community had a strong preference for low-
density, single-family residential development in undeveloped 
areas, with multi-family housing confined to areas close to the 
highway or to existing commercial nodes.”101 Based on the 
opinion of “legal experts,” the model also assumed  
that aircraft noise must be treated as a “knockout factor”: that is, if 
high noise levels were present, then a pixel simply could not be 
selected for residential use no matter how suitable it might be in 
  
 97 See id. at 624-28. 
 98 Elise Bright, Using the “ALLOT” Model in Land Use Decision-Making, in 
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS IN URBAN PLANNING 229 (Harry Timmermans ed., 1997). 
The then-state-of-the-art technology that Bright describes has no doubt become quite 
dated in the intervening years. Nonetheless, the level of detail provided by the author 
makes this a helpfully concrete example to use in thinking through the role of local 
governments in managing and deploying information.  
 99 Id.  
 100 See id. at 236.  
 101 Id.  
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every other way; the legal consequences of allowing residential 
development in these areas would be too severe.102  
While less normatively charged than the preference for single-
family dwellings, the assumptions about airport noise also raise 
empirical questions that a more thoroughly “crowdsourced” style 
of land use control might be well equipped to address: the value 
attributed to quiet, the degree of disruption from a given noise 
level, the actual noise levels involved, and the ability to buffer 
them through soundproofing or other means. 
The government’s role as a platform designer should be 
taken seriously. Some decisions are too important or sensitive, 
or too closely related to the protection of minority interests to 
“crowdsource.” At the same time, the government should not be 
too quick to take off the crowdsourcing table information about 
actual impacts that could influence the views of “the crowd.” 
Unstated empirical assumptions already frequently form 
unacknowledged parts of political judgments. Recognizing 
whether disagreements are fundamentally about values or about 
empirics is central to designing information-harnessing 
platforms that will represent improvements over the status quo.  
Special challenges are presented by forms of 
information that can influence and entrench land use patterns 
simply by being disseminated. For example, Microsoft’s 
“Pedestrian Route Production” app has fallen under criticism 
for offering an algorithm that (according to the patent 
application) can “tak[e] the user through neighborhoods with 
violent crime statistics below a certain threshold.”103 Similarly, 
the ASROmeter app provides information within England and 
Wales about “anti-social behavior” in the nearby environment. 
Both apps draw on public crime data, but as users respond to 
the cues—withdrawing from “dangerous” areas and 
frequenting “safe” ones—they may influence the data that will 
be generated in later periods.104 These data, and their 
  
 102 Id. 
 103 U.S. Patent No. 20,090,157,302 [0035] (filed Dec. 14, 2007), available at 
http://appft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.html (search “20090157302”); see also 
Allison Keyes, This App was Made for Walking—But Is it Racist?, NPR.org (Jan. 25, 
2012), http://m.npr.org/story/145337346?url=/2012/01/25/145337346/this-app-was-made-
for-walking-but-is-it-racist.  
 104 This connects to the concern about “herding” that is sometimes associated 
with sequential as opposed to simultaneous contributions of information. See Stephenson 
supra note 2, at 1474-76; see also id. at 1476-79 (discussing additional complications with 
sequential decisionmaking when information acquisition is endogenous).  
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dissemination, may also impact residential decisions, 
triggering additional responses.105  
Does this suggest that government should also play a 
role in cloaking information, as well as in eliciting and sharing 
it?106 Such a cure may be worse than the disease. Suppressing 
data is likely to be ineffectual as well, given the ability of users 
to generate and share their own information. A better approach 
may be to use this same information to counteract the self-
reinforcing cycle, as by directing more resources to areas that 
are skirted by the Pedestrian Route Production app. It should 
also be emphasized that the vicious cycles that might be 
prompted by certain kinds of information—and efforts to short-
circuit them—are nothing new. In an earlier era, “blockbusters” 
attempted to use (or manufacture) information about plans and 
intentions to intentionally destabilize neighborhoods.107 
Communities trying to maintain neighborhoods against the 
threat of “white flight” attempted to suppress informational 
signals in the form of “for sale” signs, lest those signals 
contribute to more such signals. When these efforts ran aground 
for constitutional reasons,108 communities had to find new ways to 
arrest self-reinforcing dynamics. New technologies may 
heighten the need for such solutions, but they may also 
contribute to their formulation.  
CONCLUSION 
Information is a key input into land use controls, but it 
has historically been expensive to obtain and difficult to use. 
Technological advances have reduced the cost of collecting and 
aggregating information, while theoretical advances have 
increased the potential benefits that might be derived from 
employing those aggregations. The time is ripe for rethinking 
the role that dispersed information can play in land use policy. 
To that end, local governments should explore new ways of 
crowdsourcing land use.  
  
 105 See, e.g., SCHELLING, supra note 63, at 146-47 (observing that residential 
changes may set in motion further moves).  
 106 Cf. STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 39, at 157-58 (observing that the government 
may at times use “curtains” to obscure information about certain characteristics).  
 107 See, e.g., AMANDA I. SELIGMAN, BLOCK BY BLOCK: NEIGHBORHOODS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY ON CHICAGO’S WEST SIDE 151-62 (2005); Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem 
for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and Race-Based Real Estate Speculation, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1145 (1998). 
 108 See Linmark Assoc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (striking 
down a ban on “for sale” and “sold” signs). 
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Crowdsourcing, as I use the idea here, is not the same 
thing as delegation or abdication. The point is not to turn over 
land use authority outright to the public, but rather to find 
better ways to elicit, aggregate, coordinate, and channel the 
preferences, intentions, and experiences of current and future 
land-users. Zoners and planners must begin shifting their focus 
from the top-down regulation of land use to the development of 
information platforms for coordinating land use. These 
platforms, however, must be appropriately scaled and 
normatively constrained. Slick new apps and fancy websites 
undoubtedly will be part of the future of land use control—but 
only part. The right theoretical and institutional foundations 
are also necessary. Here, I hope to have made a start at 
specifying those foundations.  
